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Abstract
This paper examines whether retailer bargaining power and upfront slot-
ting allowances prevent small manufacturers (who have no bargaining
power) from obtaining adequate distribution. In contrast to the find-
ings of Marx and Shaffer (2007), who showed that all equilibria involve
limited distribution (i.e., exclusion of a retailer), we show that there is
always an equilibrium in which full distribution is obtained, provided
that full distribution is the industry profit-maximizing outcome. The
key feature leading to this differing result is that we do not restrict each
retailer to offering the manufacturer a single tariff.
1 Introduction
In a recent paper, Marx and Shaffer (2007) study a model of vertical con-
tracting between a manufacturer and two retailers in which bargaining
power resides with the retailers, who simultaneously make take-it-or-
leave-it offers to the manufacturer. They reach the striking conclusion
that when retailers have such bargaining power, all equilibria lead to ex-
clusion of a retailer from carrying the manufacturer’s product. This is
so even though, following the reasoning of Segal (1999), exclusion would
not occur in their model were it instead the manufacturer who made
(public) take-it-or-leave it offers to the retailers. Marx and Shaffer’s ex-
clusion equilibria are sustained with “three-part tariffs” (described below
in more detail) in which the manufacturer pays the retailer an upfront
“slotting fee”, and then the retailer can buy the manufacturer’s product
under two-part tariff pricing terms. Based on their findings, they con-
clude that upfront slotting payments can prevent small manufacturers
(who have no bargaining power) from obtaining adequate distribution
(i.e., get carried by all retailers).
Following the Marx and Shaffer article, Miklos-Thal, Rey, and Verge
(forth.) observed that the result does not hold when retailers can make
contingent offers, explicitly conditional on whether they have exclusivity.
Miklos-Thal et al. show that in that case there is always an equilibrium
in the Marx and Shaffer model that maximizes industry (or “vertical
structure”) profits and does not involve any exclusion. This finding,
compared to the Marx and Shaffer result, seems to present a somewhat
paradoxical conclusion: exclusion happens only if (explicit) exclusion is
not allowed.
In this short paper we show that the key feature leading to the Marx
and Shaffer result is rather Marx and Shaffer’s restriction of retailers to
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offering a single three-part tariff. Specifically, we show that when retail-
ers can offer a menu of tariffs, there is always an equilibrium in which no
exclusion occurs and industry profits are maximized, even when the tar-
iffs cannot be made explicitly conditional on exclusivity. Our conclusion
indicates that neither retailer market power nor slotting fees necessarily
limit the distribution of manufacturers’ products. The resulting out-
come may be better for consumers than Marx and Shaffer’s exclusionary
outcome (retail coverage availability is greater, while prices may be ei-
ther higher or lower), but is generally not socially optimal because of
the industry’s market power.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In Section 2, we describe
the Marx and Shaffer model and result. In Section 3, we first present
our analysis and result in the context of the Marx and Shaffer model,
allowing for menus of three-part tariffs. Section 4 shows that a similar
result holds when we allow for more general tariffs and alternative types
of arrangements.
2 The Marx and Shaffer Model and Result
The basic framework of Marx and Shaffer is as follows. Two differenti-
ated retailers R1 and R2 distribute the product of a manufacturer M .
Retailers incur no costs other than what they pay the manufacturer,
while the manufacturer’s cost of producing quantities q1 and q2 (where
qi is the quantity sold to retailer i) is c(q1, q2). Retailers have all the bar-
gaining power in their bilateral relations with the manufacturer; their
interaction is therefore modeled as follows:
1. R1 and R2 simultaneously make take-it-or-leave-it “three-part tar-
iff” offers to M , stipulating wholesale prices w1 and w2 as well as
lump-sum fees (more on this below).
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2. M accepts or rejects each retailer’s offer; accepted contracts are
public.
3. The retailers with accepted tariffs compete on the downstream
market and the relevant tariff conditions are implemented.
Marx and Shaffer assume that the stage 3 retail equilibrium when
both retailers are making purchases at wholesale prices w1 and w2 results
in profits for M and Ri of πM (w1, w2) and πi (wi, w−i) respectively.1
Marx and Shaffer moreover assume that πi (wi, w−i) is nonincreasing in
wi and nondecreasing in w−i, as would be expected when the retailers
are (imperfect) substitutes, with these effects holding strictly at any
(w1, w2) such that πi (wi, w−i) > 0. The industry profit πM (w1, w2) +P
i πi (wi, w−i) is maximized at (w1, w2) = (w
∗
1, w∗2), where it is equal to
Π∗. If Ri instead monopolizes the retail market, the joint profit of M
and Ri is πM (wi,∞) + πi (wi,∞),2 which achieves its maximum, Πmi ,
at wholesale price wi = wmi . Marx and Shaffer focus on the case in
which industry profits are greater when both retailers are active: Π∗ >
max{Πm1 ,Πm2 }.
Finally, Marx and Shaffer assume that each retailer’s offer is a “three-





−Si if qi = 0,
−Si + Fi + wiqi if qi > 0.
Such a tariff, which we denote by Ti = (Si, Fi, wi), thus involves:
• an upfront “slotting” payment Si paid by M to Ri;
1The notation “−i” refers to Ri’s rival.
2There is a slight abuse of notation here, which simplifies the exposition; more
formally, M ’s profit under exclusivity is either πM (w1,∞) or πM (∞, w2).
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• a conditional fee F , paid to M by Ri, but only if Ri actually buys
a positive quantity;
• a per unit wholesale price wi.
Marx and Shaffer show that under these conditions all pure strat-
egy subgame perfect Nash equilibria involve exclusion: only one retailer
makes purchases from the manufacturer.
To proceed, observe first that the joint payoff of the manufacturer
M and a retailer Ri cannot be less than what they could achieve in an
exclusive relationship:
Lemma 1 When the set of allowable contract offers includes three-part
tariffs, in any subgame perfect Nash equilibrium the joint payoff of the
manufacturer M and a retailer Ri (i = 1, 2) cannot be less than Πmi .
Proof. Let ΠM and Πi be the equilibrium payoffs of M and Ri, respec-
tively, and suppose that ΠM + Πi < Πmi . Note that M must earn no
more than ΠM by accepting only a contract from R−i since otherwiseM
would have a profitable deviation.
Now consider a deviation by Ri in which he offers three-part tar-
iff eT = (eS, eF, ew) ≡ (Πmi − δ − (ΠM + ε) , πi (wmi ,∞) − δ, wmi ) where
ε ∈ (0, (Πmi −ΠM −Πi) /2) and δ ∈ (0, ε). This contract faces Ri with
wholesale price wmi , together with a fixed fee for positive quantities that
is lower than its monopoly revenues for that price. If M accepts only
Ri’s tariff eT , Ri will thus buy from M , and M ’s profit will be:
eΠM =−eS + eF + πM(wmi ,∞)
= (ΠM + ε) + δ −Πmi + πi (wmi ,∞)− δ + πM(wmi ,∞)
=ΠM + ε,
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which exceeds his payoff from accepting no contract or only a contract
offer from R−i. Thus, M must accept Ri’s contract eT in any continua-
tion equilibrium. Ri’s profit in any continuation equilibrium is therefore
bounded below by the upfront payment he receives in tariff eT : [I intro-
duced an inequality sign in the equation below, reflecting the change in
ε ∈ (0, (Πmi −ΠM −Πi) /2)]
eS = (Πmi −ΠM)− ε− δ > (Πi + 2ε)− ε− δ = Πi + ε− δ > Πi.
Hence, Ri would have a profitable deviation.
Marx and Shaffer’s exclusion result follows from Lemma 1. To see
this, observe that, as noted by Marx and Shaffer (see their Lemma 1),
in any equilibrium in which M deals with both retailers, each Ri must
make M indifferent between accepting its offer and rejecting it, since
Ri could otherwise demand a slightly larger upfront payment.3 When
each Ri can offer only a single three-part tariff Ti, this implies that if in
equilibrium M were buying from both retailers, then M ’s payoff would
be the same as in an exclusive relationship with Ri under the same tariff
Ti. On the other hand, if both retailers are making purchases, retailer
Ri’s payoff would have to be strictly less than his payoff in an exclusive
relationship under tariff Ti (since his profit is decreasing in the wholesale
price w−i). Since their joint payoff under tariff Ti can be no greater than
Πmi , this would imply that their joint payoff in this equilibrium would
be strictly less than Πmi , which is impossible by Lemma 1. So any pure
3The argument assumes here that, in case of multiple continuation equilibria, the
selection among those equilibria does not depend on the upfront payment, which
becomes a sunk cost at that stage.
Also, in their Lemma 1 Marx and Shaffer implicitly assume thatM strictly prefers
accepting either or both offers to accepting neither, i.e. that ΠM > 0. Our Assump-
tion 1 below implies that this condition holds in any equilibrium.
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strategy subgame perfect Nash equilibrium must have only one retailer
making purchases from M .
3 Menus of Three-Part Tariffs
Marx and Shaffer’s result assumes that retailers’ offers consist of a single
three-part tariff. We now examine what happens when each retailer can
instead offer a menu of three-part tariffs. With such a menu, at stage 2
M can choose which tariff, if any, to accept from each retailer. We show
that when such menus are possible a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium
exists that implements the industry profit-maximizing outcome and gives
each retailer Ri a profit equal to his “contribution” to industry profit,






We first note that Lemma 1 implies that retailers cannot earn more
than their contributions:
Corollary 2 When the set of allowable contract offers includes three-
part tariffs, in any subgame perfect Nash equilibrium a retailer Ri’s pay-
off cannot exceed his contribution, ∆i = Π∗ −Πmi .
Proof. Since ΠM + Π−i ≥ Πm−i by Lemma 1, and the total payoff is
bounded above by Π∗, we have Πi ≤ Π∗− (ΠM +Π−i) ≤ Π∗−Πm−i = ∆i.
We also will make the following assumption:
Assumption 1: Πm1 +Πm2 > Π∗.
Assumption 1 captures the notion that sales through the two retailers
are substitutes in either downstream demand or upstream manufactur-
ing costs (or both). The assumption guarantees that in equilibrium M
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always strictly prefers to accept one or both retailer offers rather than
accept none (i.e., ΠM > 0), a feature that is implicitly assumed by Marx
and Shaffer (see footnote 3).
To proceed, we construct an equilibrium supporting the (non-exclusionary)
industry profit-maximizing outcome as follows: Suppose that each re-
tailer i = 1, 2 offersM a menu Ci = (TCi , TEi ) which givesM a choice be-
tween two three-part tariffs, TCi = (SCi , FCi , wCi ) and TEi = (SEi , FEi , wEi ),
designed respectively for “common agency” and “exclusive dealing.”
(Note that since these three-part tariffs do not have any explicit ex-
clusivity requirements, M is free to accept contracts TE1 and TE2 .) The
two three-part tariffs have the following structure:
• both options involve an upfront payment that gives Ri its full con-
tribution to the industry profits: SCi = SEi = ∆i;
• the option designed for common agency, TCi , has wCi = w∗i , to sus-
tain the industry profit-maximizing outcome, and FCi = πi(w∗i , w∗−i),
equal to Ri’s equilibrium profit (gross of the payments Si and Fi);
• the option designed for exclusive dealing, TEi , has wEi = wmi ,
to sustain the bilateral profit-maximizing outcome, and FEi =
πi(wmi ,∞), equal to the profit that Ri can obtain under exclu-
sivity.




, and the re-
tailers then implement the profit-maximizing outcome: wholesale prices
(wC1 , wC2 ) = (w∗1, w∗2) generate the industry profit-maximizing prices and
quantities if both retailers buy at these prices, and they are indeed will-
ing to buy since the conditional fees (FC1 , FC2 ) do not exceed their corre-
sponding flow profits. In this continuation equilibrium, M recovers both
retailers’ flow profits through the conditional fees FCi ; therefore, each
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Ri just obtains his contribution to industry profits (∆i) through the up-
front payment Si, whereas M obtains the residual ∆M = Π∗−∆1−∆2.
Moreover, the joint profit of M and each retailer Ri, ∆i + ∆M , equals
Πmi .





constitute a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. Consider
first M ’s acceptance decision. If M accepts a tariff from both retailers,
in any continuation equilibrium each retailer Ri must earn at least Si,
which equals ∆i. So M ’s profit cannot exceed Π∗ − ∆1 − ∆2 = ∆M ,




. If, instead, M accepts
only a contract from one retailer, say Ri, then once again Ri’s payoff is





, which gives profit ∆M > 0, is an optimal choice for
M .
Now consider deviations by a retailer, say Ri. Following any de-
viation, M must earn at least ∆M , since this is what she receives by
accepting only retailer R−i’s tariff TE−i. So if M accepts only a con-
tract from Ri, Ri’s profit cannot increase since the joint profit of M
and Ri is bounded above by their equilibrium joint profit, Πmi . If M
instead accepts a contract from both retailers, then since R−i must earn
at least ∆−i (= SC−i = SE−i) in any continuation equilibrium, Ri’s profit
is bounded above by Π∗−∆M−∆−i = ∆i. Thus, no profitable deviation
exists for the retailers either.
The above offers and contination play thus constitute a subgame per-
fect Nash equilibrium in which both retailers are active and each retailer
Ri earns its maximal achievable profit,∆i. Both retailers therefore prefer
this equilibrium to any other equilibrium. In summary:
Proposition 3 When retailers can offer menus of three-part tariffs,
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there exists a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium in which both retailers
are active, industry profits are at the industry profit-maximizing level
(Π∗), and the retailers earn their respective contributions to these profits
(∆1 and ∆2).
Themenus of contracts offered by each retailerRi here can be thought
of as allowing M to respond in his contract with Ri to information M
subsequently learns about the other retailer R−i’s offer. That this can
matter for equilibria can be seen in previous work on contracting with
externalities/common agency [Segal and Whinston (2003), Martimort
and Stole (2003)]. In the Marx and Shaffer setting, when menus are not
allowedM has only an inefficient (i.e., not profit-maximizing) option for
dealing exclusively with each retailer Ri. This leads retailer R−i to be
overly aggressive in his contract offer, leaving too little surplus for M
and Ri, and causing Ri to deviate in a manner that leads M to deal
exclusively with him. With a menu, each retailer can instead offer both
a contract that works well if accepted together with a contract from
the other retailer and a contract that works well if accepted on its own.
Should either retailer demand too much of the surplus, the manufacturer
can respond by accepting an attractive (i.e., profit-maximizing) option
for dealing with only the other retailer.
The fact that a retailer can design a contract intended for an “exclu-
sive” relationship in a way that ensuresM will not also accept a contract
from the retailer’s rival follows from the same logic as in Marx and Shaf-
fer’s paper: in the “exclusive” contract each retailer Ri is indifferent
about whether to purchase, so acceptance of a contract from the rival
R−i causes Ri to cease carryingM ’s goods, which makes accepting R−i’s
contract unprofitable. As noted by Miklos-Thal et al., however, slotting
fees are not essential for accomplishing this goal. For example, we show
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in the Appendix that when M faces a constant unit cost c, under mild
regularity conditions the retailers can sustain the monopoly outcome by
offering menus consisting of the following two options, which coincide
with the previous tariffs TCi and TEi for large enough quantities but in-
volve no slotting fees and cover the manufacturer’s costs regardless of
the quantity purchased:
• an option designed for common agency, satisfying TˆCi (qi) = cqi for
q ≤ qCi , and TˆCi (qi) = FCi +w∗i qi for q > qCi , where qCi and FCi are
chosen so that, given R−i’s equilibrium behavior, Ri can obtain its
contribution ∆i either by selling qCi (and buying it at cost) or by
selling the larger profit-maximizing quantity q∗i ≡ qi(w∗i , w∗−i) [and
paying TˆCi (q∗i )];
• an option designed for exclusive dealing, TˆEi , satisfying TˆEi (qi) =
cqi for q ≤ qEi and TˆEi (qi) = FEi + wmi qi for q > qEi , where qEi and
FEi are chosen so that, absent R−i, Ri can obtain its contribution
∆i by buying qEi (at cost) as well as by buying the larger bilateral
monopoly quantity qmi ≡ qmi (wmi ,∞) [and paying TˆEi (qmi )].
4 Extensions
Following Marx and Shaffer, we have focused so far on the set of out-
comes achievable with contracts in which retailers face constant mar-
ginal wholesale prices. When retailer demand functions are not concave,
this may limit the ability to support the industry profit-maximizing
outcome. That is, letting ρi (qi, q−i) denote the revenue generated by
Ri’s sales, in the model studied above it may be that Π∗ < maxq1,q2P
i ρi (qi, q−i) qi − c(q1, q2). Here we show that similar insights apply to
the unconstrained industry profits and, equally important, we extend
the analysis to any number of retailers.
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Suppose that there are n retailers, and let N ≡ {1, ..., n}. For any
quantity profile q ∈ Q =
©
(qi)i∈N | qi ∈ R+
ª
, denote the industry profit
by Π (q) ≡
P
i∈N ρi (q)−c (q). Finally, for any subset of retailers S ⊂ N ,
define QS = {q ∈ Q | qi = 0 if i /∈ S} and suppose that the maximal
profit that M and the retailers in S can obtain together, denoted ΠS ≡
maxq∈QS Π (q), is achieved at q = qS. These retailers’ joint contribution
to industry profit is then defined as ∆S ≡ ΠN − ΠN\S. For the sake
of exposition, we will use the notation ∆i ≡ ∆{i} for Ri’s individual
contribution. As before, ∆M ≡ ΠN −
P
i∈N ∆i isM ’s residual profit. To
reflect retailers’ imperfect substitutability, we assume:
Assumption 1’: For any subset S such that #S ≥ 2, ∆S >P
i∈S∆i.
Assumption 1’ asserts that retailers are substitutes to each other
in generating industry profit. For example, in the two retailer model









The retailers can again use menus of contracts to sustain the industry
profit ΠN . To see this, suppose that each Ri offers a contract consisting
of the following options:
• a tariff TCi designed for common agency, giving Ri the choice be-
tween C0i ≡ (−∆i, 0), which consists of buying nothing and re-










• for each rival Rj, a tariff TEij designed for the case where Rj is
excluded, giving Ri the choice between C0i or CEij ≡ (FEij , q
N\{j}
i ),














there is a continuation equilibrium in which each Ri opts for CCi (each Ri
is then indifferent between C0i and CCi ). This continuation equilibrium
sustains the industry profit maximum ΠN , gives each Ri its contribution
∆i, and thus gives M its residual contribution ∆M . The joint profit of
M and any subset S of retailers is moreover at least what they could




∆i = ΠN −
X
j∈N\S
∆j ≥ ΠN −∆N\S = ΠS,
where the inequality follows from part (ii) of Assumption 1’. This, in
turn, implies that M cannot benefit from selecting any other set of op-
tions, since any Ri whose offer is accepted can secure its contribution ∆i
by opting for C0i , and dealing with a set S of retailers cannot generate
more than ΠS.
Finally, no Ri can benefit from deviating. To see this, observe first
that M can also secure its contribution ∆M by accepting the tariffs¡
TEji
¢
j∈N\{i}: this induces every other retailer Rj, j 6= i, to opt for CEji
(this is indeed a continuation equilibrium since eachRj is then indifferent














∆j = ∆M .
(1)
Moreover, any Rj whose offer is accepted can again secure its contribu-
tion ∆j by opting for C0j . Thus, if a deviation by Ri leads M to accept


















where the inequality follows again from Assumption 1’.
Alternatively, one could build on Segal (1999)’s result mentioned in
the Introduction. To sustain the industry profit maximum, suppose that
each retailer Ri offers the manufacturer the following contract: “For a
payment of ∆i you can make a take-it-or-leave-it offer to me.” If M
accepts all offers, then by Segal’s result the industry profit-maximizing
outcome arises, and each party receives the same payoff as above. More-
over, since M and retailers in S ⊂ N obtain ΠS in the candidate equi-
librium, M is indeed willing to accept all the offers if they are made.
Now consider whether any retailer has an incentive to deviate. The ar-
gument parallels that above: Any Ri whose offer is accepted obtains its
contribution ∆i and, from (1), M can also secure its own contribution
∆M by accepting the offers of all of Ri’s rivals. Therefore, by inducing
M to accept the offers of a subset S of retailers, Ri cannot earn more





We show in this Appendix that, when M faces a constant marginal
cost c, it is possible to sustain the industry profit maximum Π∗ by offer-
ing the tariffs TˆCi and TˆEi described in the text. The exact specification
of the options depends on the nature of retail competition. For the sake
of exposition, we will assume here that: (i) retailers compete in quan-
tities (a similar analysis applies to price competition); (ii) the revenue
generated by Ri’s sales, ρi (qi, q−i), is continuous (with ρi (0, q−i) = 0
for all q−i), strictly concave in qi, decreasing in q−i (and strictly so if
ρi (qi, q−i) > 0), and leads quantities to be strategic substitutes, i.e.,
∂2ρi/∂qi∂q−i < 0 . Let (q∗1, q∗2) denote the quantities purchased in the
industry profit maximum supported by wholesale prices (w∗1, w∗2), and
let qmi denote the quantity, supported by wmi , that maximizes profits in
an exclusive relationship with Ri. Note that under these assumptions,
wmi = c.4
The parameters of the tariff TˆEi are designed so that qEi is the smallest
quantity satisfying ρi (qi, 0) − cqi = ∆i, and FEi = Πmi − ∆i = ∆M .
Similarly, the parameters of the tariff TˆCi are designed so that qCi is the









w∗i q∗i −∆i. It is straightforward to check that the quantity thresholds lie
below the (industry or bilateral) monopoly levels (that is, qCi < q∗i and
qEi < qmi ),5 and that the tariffs jump upwards at these thresholds (so









q∗−i for i = 1, 2
induce the true industry profit maximum maxq1,q2
P
i ρi(qi, q−i)qi − c(q1 + q2).
5This follows from our concavity assumption since the quantity qCi is the smallest
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payments exceed the manufacturer’s cost at all quantities).6
By construction, ifM chooses TˆC1 and TˆC2 , there exists a continuation
equilibrium yielding the profit-maximizing outcome: each Ri, anticipat-
ing q−i = q∗−i, finds it optimal to choose q∗i in the range qi > qCi where
it faces the wholesale price w∗i , is by construction indifferent between
q∗i and qCi , and prefers these quantities to any quantity qi < qCi ; it is
thus willing to choose qi = q∗i . In this continuation equilibrium, each Ri































whereas qEi is the smallest solution to ρi (qi, 0)− cqi = ∆i, where
∆i = Π∗ −Πm−i < Πmi = maxqi ρi (qi, 0)− cqi.
6This fact derives from Assumption 1 for TˆEi , which, since w
m
i = c, jumps by
∆M > 0 at qEi . For Tˆ
C
i , the jump at q
C
i is equal to
Ji ≡ (w∗i − c) qCi + FCi ,
























































− w∗i qCi ] > 0,
where the last equality derives from the fact that (q∗1 , q∗2) is a Nash equilibrium given
wholesale prices (w∗1, w
∗
2) and the inequality stems from q
C
i 6= q∗i and strict concavity.
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(= Π∗ −∆1 −∆2); the joint profit of M and each retailer Ri, ∆i +∆M ,
thus equals Πmi .
If the retailers make the above-described offers, M cannot gain from
accepting any other combination of options: M can obtain ∆M by ac-
cepting only TˆEi since, anticipating being alone in the market, Ri is
willing to buy qmi , which gives ∆M to M and ∆i to Ri. If instead M
accepts only TˆCi , then Ri can secure more than ∆i (e.g., by choosing
q∗i ), since it no longer faces competition, implying thatM cannot obtain
more than Πmi −∆i = ∆M . If M instead accepts TˆE1 and TˆE2 , then from
strategic substitutability either each Ri chooses qi ≤ qEi and M obtains
zero profit, or one retailer chooses qmi while its rival chooses q−i = 0, and
M obtains again ∆M . Finally, suppose that M accepts TˆEi and TˆC−i. If
R−i is not active, then again Ri chooses qmi and M obtains ∆M . If R−i
is active (i.e., q−i > 0), then from strategic substitutability Ri chooses
again qi ≤ qEi and appropriates all the profit generated by its sales.
Furthermore, if qi > q∗i then R−i chooses q−i ≤ qC−i and M obtains zero
profit; if instead qi ≤ q∗i , then R−i obtains at least ∆i (e.g., by choosing
q∗−i) and thus, since its sales cannot generate more than Πmi , M cannot
obtain more than Πmi −∆i = ∆M .
Summing-up, if the retailers offer the above-mentioned options, there
is a continuation equilibrium in which M chooses TˆC1 and TˆC2 , and then
the retailers implement the profit-maximizing outcome. We now check
that no retailer has an incentive to deviate.
As before, a deviation by R−i, say, can be profitable only if it in-
creases the joint profit of M and R−i above the equilibrium level, Πm−i,
sinceM can always secure ∆M by accepting TˆEi only. It follows that R−i
cannot benefit from deviating in a way that leadsM to reject Ri’s offers,
since they cannot generate more than Πm−i in this way.
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Consider now a deviation by R−i that leads M to accept TˆEi . Then,
as above, either R−i ends up selling nothing, in which case Ri can secure
∆i (e.g., by choosing qi = qmi ) and thus the joint profit of M and R−i
cannot exceed Π∗ −∆i = Πm−i, or because R−i sells a positive amount,
Ri will buy less than qEi , in which case M supplies Ri at cost, and thus
the joint profit of M and R−i equals ρ−i (q−i, qi) − cq−i, which cannot
exceed Πm−i = maxq−i[ρ−i (q−i, 0)− cq−i].
Finally, consider a deviation by R−i that leads M to accept TˆCi . If
R−i ends up selling more than q∗−i, then Ri will buy — at cost — less than
qCi ; the joint profit ofM and R−i then again equals [ρ−i (q−i, qi)−cq−i] ≤
Πm−i. If instead R−i ends up selling less than q∗−i, then Ri can secure ∆i
(e.g., by choosing qi = qmi ) and thus, again, the joint profit of M and
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